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The possibility of precognition has fasci-
nated humanity since ancient times mak-
ing it a recurring theme in fiction and
mythology. It has also been a topic for
scientific investigation. While the major-
ity of such parapsychological studies have
been ignored by the larger scientific
community, several recent studies of pur-
ported precognitive phenomena were pub-
lished by major international psychology
journals. A widely publicized study by
Daryl Bem claimed to have found evi-
dence of precognition (Bem, 2011). In
its wake have been discussions about
the appropriate statistical approach for
testing these effects (Bem et al., 2011;
Rouder and Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers
et al., 2011), and it caused a wave
of replication attempts most of which,
at least those conducted by researchers
skeptical of precognition, have failed
(Galak et al., 2012; Ritchie et al., 2012;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). More recently,
two articles in Frontiers in Psychology
and Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
reported a meta-analysis of experiments
on “predictive anticipatory activity” or
“presentiment” (Mossbridge et al., 2012,
2014). In that paradigm participants are
exposed to a series of random stimuli,
some arousing (violent/erotic images, loud
sounds), others calm controls (neutral
images, silence). Apparently, physiological
responses evoked by the two trial types
prior to stimulus onset predict the upcom-
ing stimulus.
Such findings of “psi” effects fuel the
imagination and most people probably
agree that there are things that cur-
rent scientific knowledge cannot explain.
However, the seismic nature of these
claims cannot be overstated: future events
influencing the past breaks the second law
of thermodynamics. If one accepts these
claims to be true, one should also be pre-
pared to accept the existence of perpetual
motion and time travel. It also completely
undermines over a century of experimen-
tal research based on the assumption that
causes precede effects. Differences in pre-
stimulus activity would invalidate base-
line correction procedures fundamental
to many different types of data analysis.
While the meta-analysis briefly discusses
this implication (Mossbridge et al., 2012),
the authors are seemingly unaware of the
far-reaching consequences of their claims:
they effectively invalidate most of the neu-
roscience and psychology literature, from
electrophysiology and neuroimaging to
temporal effects found in psychophysical
research. Thus, it seems justified to ask for
extraordinary evidence to support claims
of this magnitude (Truzzi, 1978; Sagan,
1995).
But what constitutes extraordinary evi-
dence? The results of this and other simi-
lar meta-analyses on psi effects are highly
significant under commonly used infer-
ential statistics and in many cases also
strongly supported by Bayesian inference.
Applying the standards accepted by the
larger scientific community, should this
not suffice to convince us that precogni-
tion/presentiment are real?
To me this interpretation betrays a
deep-seated misapprehension of the scien-
tific method. Statistical inference, regard-
less of whatever form it takes, only assigns
probabilities. It cannot ever prove or dis-
prove a theory. In fact, unlike mathemati-
cal theorems, scientific theories are never
proven. They can only be supported by
evidence and must always be subjected
to scientific skepticism. The presentiment
meta-analysis (Mossbridge et al., 2012,
2014) illustrates how this process can
be misapplied. A significant effect does
not confirm psi but it raises many new
questions.
First, any meta-analysis can only be
as good as the primary studies it ana-
lyzes. Several of the studies included are
of questionable quality, e.g., the fMRI
experiment (Bierman and Scholte, 2002)
commits major errors with multiple com-
parison correction and circular inference
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Vul et al., 2009)
and has such poor presentation that it
is unlikely it would have been accepted
for publication in any major neuroimag-
ing journal. Moreover, many studies were
in fact published in conference proceed-
ings and did not pass formal peer review.
Admittedly, the authors go to some lengths
to assess the quality of each study but
it is unclear how appropriate those qual-
ity scores were. In fact the rationale for
the formula used to combine the differ-
ent measures is debatable. A more detailed
breakdown of how these different parame-
ters influence the results would have been
far more interesting. Does the type of ran-
dom number generator used, or whether
a study was peer reviewed, make any dif-
ference to the results? Related to this,
additional factors would have been of
importance, such as whether the experi-
menters expected to find a presentiment
effect (see also: Galak et al., 2012).
Second, the meta-analysis should be
much broader including myriad studies
not conducted by psi researchers that used
similar designs. While the authors tested
for potential publication bias (the possi-
bility that many null-results that would
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have made the results non-significant are
missing from the database), there must be
a large number of data sets from similar
protocols in the wider literature, in par-
ticular in emotion research, whose inclu-
sion would greatly enhance the power of
this analysis. An often used argument, that
these studies are invalid because they used
counterbalanced designs and are thus con-
founded by expectation bias, is a straw
man and also rather ironic given the topic
of investigation: unless participants knew
in advance that stimuli were counterbal-
anced this could not possibly change their
expectations.
Third, a particular critical factor that
should have been analyzed directly is the
imbalance between control (calm) and tar-
get (arousing) trials typically used in these
studies. While the authors themselves
acknowledge that this is usually approxi-
mately 2:1 (Mossbridge et al., 2012), this is
neglected by the meta-analysis and seem-
ingly most primary studies even though
such an imbalance means that an atten-
tive participant will quickly learn statistical
properties of the sequence and thus affects
how the brain responds to the differ-
ent stimulus classes. Rather than predict-
ing future events, what such pre-stimulus
physiological activity may actually reflect
is that the brain can make predictions of
probable events. One important factor to
be included in the meta-analysis therefore
should have been whether the ratio of tar-
get and control trials affects the magnitude
of these pre-stimulus effects.
Fourth, could these effects be at least
partially explained by analytical artifacts?
In many of these studies (Bierman and
Scholte, 2002; Radin, 2004) the data are
not only baseline corrected to the mean
activity level prior to stimulus onset, but
they are further “clamped” to a partic-
ular time point prior to the stimulus.
This should not necessarily influence the
results if this point is a true baseline.
However, if this pre-stimulus period is
still affected by the response to the previ-
ous stimulus (e.g., the signal could decay
back to baseline more slowly after an
arousing than a calm trial) such a correc-
tion would inadvertently introduce arti-
facts in the pre-stimulus period. As such
it may also be a much greater problem
for slow than fast physiological measures.
Either way, it would have been another
factor worthy of attention in the meta-
analysis.
Fifth, the effect of expectation and trial
order must be tested explicitly. Many of
these studies test for the presence of expec-
tation bias by correlating the presentiment
effect with the time between target events
(Mossbridge et al., 2012). The rationale
is that expectation bias increases with the
number of control trials—a gambler’s fal-
lacy. Therefore, so the reasoning goes, the
pre-stimulus activity should also increase.
However, this is based on an unproven
assumption that these physiological effects
scale linearly with expectation. Further,
because the probability of sequences of
control trials falls off exponentially with
their length, the presentiment effect can-
not be estimated with the same reliabil-
ity for long sequences as for short ones.
This means that even if a linear relation-
ship exists, the power to detect it is low
as the presentiment response is subject to
variability. Critically, this analysis cannot
possibly detect whether participants learn
statistical regularities in the trial sequence.
The best approach to understand the role
of trial order and expectation would be
to design experiments that directly test
these factors. Order effects are quanti-
fied by exposing participants to different
stimulus pairs. Expectation bias can be
manipulated by cuing participants to the
probability that the upcoming trial is a tar-
get. If the predictive activity were similar to
the presentiment effect when participants
strongly expect a target trial, this would
indicate that it may in fact be an expec-
tation effect. Crucially, does presentiment
persist when participants do not expect a
target even when the next trial is one?
Lastly, are the purported effects even
biologically plausible? These studies
employ vastly different measurements
from skin conductance and electrophysi-
ology to hemodynamic responses. Under
conventional knowledge these are assumed
to be caused by preceding neural events,
e.g., a typical hemodynamic response
peaks ∼6 s after a neural event (Boynton
et al., 1996). Conversely, electrophysiologi-
cal measures have a latency of fractions of a
second, while skin conductance measures,
heart rates, pupil dilation etc. probably fall
somewhere in between. Thus, the same
precognitive neural event probably cannot
cause all of these responses. Alternatively,
if these responses themselves reverse the
arrow of time and are caused by future
stimuli, this will require a complete over-
haul of current theory. Why should blood
oxygenation increase before neural activity
in such a way that predicts the up-coming
stimulus?
Inmymind, only if all these points were
addressed appropriately, should one even
entertain the thought that such presenti-
ment effects have been empirically demon-
strated. The first four could have certainly
formed part of the meta-analysis; it is
frankly a clear failure of the peer review
process that they were not. The final two
points should at the very least be discussed
as critical further steps before assuming
that the effects reverse causality.
Much of parapsychology research is
concerned with proving that psi is real
(Alcock, 2003), that is, it rests on the
notion that “there is an anomalous effect
in need of an explanation” (Utts, 1991).
But there is always unexplained variance
in any data regardless of how significant
the results are. It is the purpose of sci-
entific investigation to explain as much
as possible, not to conclude that there
remains something we do not currently
understand. Science works by formulat-
ing falsifiable hypotheses and testing them.
This in turn will produce new findings that
can be used to generate better theories.
Further, one should always start from the
most parsimonious explanation for a result.
Only if a more complex model has greater
explanatory power should we stray from
the one requiring the least assumptions
(Figure 1). Since the psi hypothesis merely
postulates that some results remain unex-
plained, it does not lead to any falsifiable
hypothesis that could help explain these
effects. Post-hoc speculations of quantum
biology or psychokinesis are insufficient
unless they can make testable predictions
and they are hardly the most parsimonious
explanations.
Certainly, science should be open-
minded and no hypothesis must be dis-
missed out of hand—but this does not
mean that every possible hypothesis is
equally likely. A former colleague of
mine once wrote very eloquently: “Science
is not about finding the truth at all,
but about finding better ways of being
wrong” (Schofield, 2013). Not only does
our present understanding fail to explain
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FIGURE 1 | Simplistic schematic of the heliocentric model (left) and the geocentric model
(right). The motion of the Sun (yellow) and the planets Earth (blue) and Venus (orange) is shown.
Under the heliocentric model both Earth and Venus have simple circular orbits around the Sun. In
contrast, under the geocentric model Venus describes a complicated (albeit beautiful) path. The
heliocentric model is by far the more parsimonious explanation for our observation of the motions
of celestial bodies, especially when taking Newtonian physics into account. It is important to note
that this heliocentric model is not the “true” model as for instance the orbits are not circular and
the planets do not strictly revolve around the center of the sun. However, it is certainly the better
model of the two as it requires fewer assumptions.
everything about the universe, we must
accept that we will never explain every-
thing. Importantly, this also means that we
must always remain skeptical of any claims
but especially our own.
It would be an easy mistake for
“mainstream” researchers to accuse para-
psychologists of being solely responsible
for perpetuating this non-skeptical think-
ing. Yet it is only human to cling to theories
against compelling evidence to the con-
trary. We all must be more critical. As
Richard Feynman put it: “The first prin-
ciple is that you must not fool yourself
and you are the easiest person to fool”
(Feynman, 2010). If some result is too
good to be true, it probably is. We should
actively strive for our hypotheses to be
proven incorrect. And we should stop rely-
ing on statistics at the expense of objective
reasoning. If we do not, I predict we will
see many more such studies (on psi or
something else) published inmajor science
journals. They will not bring us any closer
to understanding the cosmos.
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